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Abstract
This study presents voting on policies including labor and capital income taxes
and public debt in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capi-
tal accumulation, and it then analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government’s
policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The debt ceiling induces
the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but
stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expen-
diture, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured
from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner; lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tighten-
ing fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner’s
allocation in an aging society.
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries have experienced large budget deficits and growing public debt
in the last two decades. In 1998, the average general government debt as a percentage of
GDP was 73.58% in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries, while it was 93.70% in 2017. In particular, the ratio increased more
than 40 points in France, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.1 The increased public debt is also a feature of developing countries (World
Bank, 2019). Given this background, various types of fiscal rules have been introduced
to control deficits, spending, and debt (e.g., Budina et al., 2012). In 2013, the rules were
in place in 97 countries (Halac and Yared, 2018).
The present study focuses on debt ceilings that control public debt and deficits. Im-
posing debt ceilings constrains fiscal policy choice (Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter,
2018) and thus may have the potential to improve welfare since political frictions in fis-
cal policymaking mean that the equilibrium public debt level is too high relative to the
efficient one (Battaglini and Coate, 2008). Specifically, imposing debt ceilings may create
long-run benefits of a lower debt burden at the cost of potentially short-run increased
tax burdens, and thus a net benefit in terms of welfare. The possibility of such a welfare
improvement is shown to be achieved by introducing a balanced budget rule (Azzimonti,
Battaglini, and Coate, 2016) and an austerity program with a target level for debt and a
time horizon (Barseghyan and Battaglini, 2016).
The welfare improvement is possible in the framework of Azzimonti, Battaglini, and
Coate (2016) and Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016) because they assume infinitely lived
households that can make up the short-run increased tax burdens with the benefits of
reduced debt burdens accruing in the future. Such an improvement is not seen when
we alternatively assume overlapping generations of finitely lived households (Arai, Naito,
and Ono, 2018). In particular, agents who owe the costs of increased tax burdens today
would not be alive in the future to enjoy the benefits of reduced debt burdens, suggesting
a limitation of debt ceilings.
The present study reexamines debt ceilings from the viewpoint of generational conflict
over tax burdens for debt repayment. In particular, we investigate how changes in debt
ceilings distribute the fiscal burden across generations. To pursue our analysis, we present
an overlapping-generations model with capital income tax on the retired generation and
labor income tax on the working generation. Each generation comprises many identical in-
dividuals who live over three periods: young, working middle, and retired old ages. Public
education spending and parental human capital are inputs in the human capital forma-
1Source: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm (Accessed on June 14, 2019).
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tion process, thereby contributing to children’s human capital formation and economic
growth (e.g., Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014; Ono and Uchida, 2016).
Governments, as elected representatives, finance public education spending through taxes
on capital and labor income and public debt issues.2
Under this framework, we consider the politics of fiscal policy formation. In particular,
following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and the studies that followed, we assume
probabilistic voting a` la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) to demonstrate the extent to which
generations face conflict over such policies. In each period, middle-aged and old individ-
uals vote on candidates.3 The government, represented by elected politicians, maximizes
the political objective function of the weighted sum of the utilities of the middle-aged and
old populations. In this voting environment, the current policy choice affects the decision
on future policy via physical and human capital accumulation. This intertemporal effect
creates the two driving forces that shape fiscal policy, namely the general equilibrium
effect through the interest rate and the disciplining effect through the capital income tax
rate in the next period, both of which have received little attention in previous studies
(see the literature review below). The two effects induce the government to finance part
of its expenditure by public debt issues.4
The analysis proceeds as follows. Firstly, we provide the characterization of the polit-
ical equilibrium in the absence of the debt ceiling and then compare it with an alternative
scenario, called tax financing, in which the government is prohibited from issuing public
debt; hence, its expenditure is financed solely through taxation. This scenario, while an
extreme one, enables us to investigate in a tractable way the effect of controlling debt is-
sues. We show that the labor tax rate increases, while the capital tax rate decreases if the
government changes its instrument from debt financing to tax financing. Consequently,
changes in tax rates could produce two opposing effects. In addition, tax financing re-
moves the crowding-out effect of public bonds on physical capital and thus enhances
human capital accumulation. Although distant future generations benefit from this pos-
itive accumulation effect that outweighs the effects through taxes, the initial generation
does not. Therefore, the change in financing produces a trade-off in terms of utility across
2Boldrin (2005) and Soares (2003, 2006) also analyze the politics of public education spending financed
by taxing capital and labor income. However, they assume a balanced government budget and thus ignore
public debt issues.
3The young may also have an incentive to vote since they benefit from public education in the future.
However, for the tractability of the analysis, we assume that politicians do not care about the young’s
preferences following Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), and Lancia and
Russo (2016). This assumption is supported in part by the fact that a large number of the young are
below the voting age.
4In the present framework, the government has access to labor and capital income taxes and public
debt to finance its expenditure. Our analysis shows that in this framework, it employs all the policy
measures from the viewpoint of its optimization; there is no underutilized policy instrument in the
political equilibrium.
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generations.
Secondly, we consider a more realistic fiscal rule that sets an explicit ceiling for public
debt as a percentage of GDP, which has been widely introduced in developed countries
(Schaechter et al., 2012). We show that lowering the debt ceiling incentivizes the govern-
ment to raise the labor income tax rate to compensate for the loss of revenue from public
bond issues. This creates a negative income effect on public education expenditure. At
the same time, lowering the debt ceiling mitigates the crowding-out effect of public debt,
boosts physical capital accumulation, and thus lowers the interest rate. This negative
effect on the interest rate gives the government an incentive to increase public education
expenditure because increased expenditure turns out to increase the interest rate and thus
offsets the negative effect. In sum, the two opposing effects produce an initial increase
in the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio followed by a decrease. While the effect on
public education is non-monotone, the positive effect on physical capital outweighs the
possible negative effect on public education, and thus works to increase the growth rate.
Thus, lowering the debt ceiling is growth-enhancing. However, it is not Pareto-improving
because the future generation can enjoy benefits from economic growth at the expense
of current generations that owe increased tax burdens. We also show that even if the
ceiling is imposed only for limited periods, it has a long-lasting effect on utility across
generations since increased human capital is bequeathed from generation to generation.
Thirdly, to further motivate the analysis of debt ceilings, we evaluate the optimality
of the political equilibrium from the viewpoint of the planner’s allocation. The long-lived
planner by its nature has an incentive to invest more in education than short-sighted
politicians. This implies that the share of resources devoted to education (consumption)
is lower (higher) at the political equilibrium than in the planner’s allocation, showing
the suboptimality of the political equilibrium. To resolve this, we control debt ceilings
to approach the planner’s allocation. We show that when the weight on the old in the
political objective function is high, politicians are highly incentivized to cut education
expenditure and place part of tax burdens onto future generations through public debt
issues. Lowering debt ceilings diminishes politicians’ incentive and thus enables them
to approach the planner’s allocation. This suggests a rationale for strengthening fiscal
discipline in an aging society. However, when the weight on the young is high and the
initial level of debt ceilings is low, lowering debt ceilings widens the gap between the
planner’s and political equilibrium allocations. The results suggest that the consequence
of tightening fiscal discipline depends on aging rates as well as the initial levels of debt
ceilings.
In the main analysis, we assume that public spending is limited to education and
that the old do not enjoy any public expenditure. When the old directly benefit from
public expenditure such as public good provision, they may induce politicians to raise such
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expenditure for them as well as put a fiscal burden onto future generations by issuing more
public debt. We examine this possibility and show that in the present framework such a
case does not arise because the middle-aged, who also benefit from public good provision,
find it optimal to reduce debt issues and increase public good provision in old age. This
disciplining effect (as indicated by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012) works to reduce
rather than increase public debt issues.
Relation to the Literature The present study follows Cukierman and Meltzer (1989),
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012, 2016), Ro¨hrs (2016), Arawatari and Ono (2017),
and Ono and Uchida (2018) by employing the overlapping-generations model with public
debt and introduces debt ceilings into the model. The study departs from previous ones
and contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it assumes two different taxes,
namely labor income tax on the middle-aged and capital income tax on the retired old,
rather than a single tax instrument, namely a tax on labor income. This assumption
enables us to present the disciplining effect through the capital income tax rate, which is
absent in previous studies. It also enables us to demonstrate how the costs of debt ceilings
are distributed between generations through tax burdens and how this distribution in turn
affects growth and welfare over time and across generations.
Second, the present study focuses on public education as a source of economic growth
through physical and human capital accumulation.5 This makes it possible to demonstrate
the endogenous determination of an interest rate and its impact on policy formation. This
general equilibrium effect of physical and human capital through the interest rate is absent
in Arai, Naito, and Ono (2018), who employ AK technology, and Battaglini and Coate
(2008, 2016), Barseghyan, Battaglini, and Coate (2013), Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate
(2016), and Cunha and Ornelas (2018), who assume constant interest rates. An exception
is Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016), who demonstrate the general equilibrium effect by
considering public investment to be a source of productivity growth. In particular, they
show that a temporary austerity program induces only a temporary effect on policies and
economic growth. By contrast, the present study shows that the temporary program has
a long-lasting effect through human capital accumulation that benefits future generations.
This result suggests the potential importance of public education and human capital when
we evaluate the effect of debt rules in the short and long run.
Third, the present study introduces an imaginary social planner who cares about all
generations and aims to maximize the weighted sum of utilities across generations. Then,
it investigates under what condition the debt ceiling induces politicians to choose fiscal
5Our companion study (Ono and Uchida, 2018) also demonstrates the model with physical and human
capital accumulation, but it assumes that only one generation participates in voting, thereby lacking the
generational conflict over taxes and spending.
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policy that approximates the planner’s allocation. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012)
use the planner’s allocation to evaluate the optimality of the political equilibrium in the
absence of a debt ceiling, whereas Arai, Naito, and Ono (2018) rely on the Pareto criterion
to evaluate the effects of the debt ceiling on welfare across generations. The present study
is thus an attempt to bridge the gap between these two studies. The study is also related
to Cunha and Ornelas (2018), who point out that a tight debt ceiling can exacerbate
political economy distortions, focusing on the degree of political turnover. We instead
focus on the political power of the old and offer an alternative insight into the effect of
the debt ceiling.
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 describes the political equilibrium. Section 4 compares the debt- and
tax-financing political equilibria; it also investigates the effects of the debt ceiling rule.
Section 5 provides a characterization of the planner’s allocation and compares it with
the political equilibrium. Section 6 investigates the case including public good provision.
Section 7 presents concluding remarks.
2 Model
The discrete time economy starts in period 0 and consists of overlapping generations.
Individuals are identical within a generation and live for three periods: youth, middle,
and old ages. Each middle-aged individual gives birth to 1+n children. The middle-aged
population for period t is Nt and the population grows at a constant rate of n(> −1) :
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals display the following economic behavior over their lifecycles. During youth,
they make no economic decisions and receive public education financed by the government.
In middle age, individuals work, receive market wages, and make tax payments. They
use after-tax income for consumption and savings. Individuals retire in their elderly years
and receive and consume returns from savings.
Consider an individual born in period t − 1. In period t, the individual is middle-
aged and endowed with ht units of human capital inherited from his or her parents. The
individual supplies them inelastically in the labor market and obtains labor income wtht,
where wt is the wage rate per efficient unit of labor in period t. After paying tax τtwtht,
where τt ∈ (0, 1) is the period t labor income tax rate, the individual distributes the after-
tax income between consumption ct and savings invested in physical capital st. Therefore,
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the period t budget constraint for the middle age becomes
ct + st ≤ (1− τt)wtht.
The period t+ 1 budget constraint in elderly age is
dt+1 ≤
(
1− τ kt+1
)
Rt+1st,
where dt+1 is consumption, τ
k
t+1 is the period t + 1 capital income tax rate, Rt+1(> 0)
is the gross return from investment in physical capital, and Rt+1st is the return from
savings. The results are qualitatively unchanged if capital income tax is on the net return
from saving rather than the gross return from saving.
Children’s human capital in period t + 1, ht+1, is a function of government spending
on public education, xt, and parents’ human capital, ht. In particular, ht+1 is formulated
using the following equation:
ht+1 = D (xt)
η (ht)
1−η , (1)
where D(> 0) is a scale factor and η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of education technology
with respect to education spending.6
The preferences of an individual born in period t − 1 are specified by the following
expected utility function in the logarithmic form:
Ut = ln ct + β ln dt+1,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. We substitute the budget constraints into the utility
function to form the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
{st}
ln [(1− τt)wtht − st] + β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
)
Rt+1st.
By solving this problem, we obtain the following savings and consumption functions:
st =
β
1 + β
· (1− τt)wtht, (2)
ct =
1
1 + β
· (1− τt)wtht,
dt+1 =
(
1− τ kt+1
)
Rt+1 · β
1 + β
· (1− τt)wtht.
6Private investment in education may also contribute to human capital formation. For example,
parents’ time (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001, 2003; Glomm and Kaganovich, 2008) or spending
(Glomm, 2004; Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014) devoted to education may complement
public education. In the present study, we abstract private education from the main analysis to simplify
the presentation of the model.
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2.2 Firms
Each period contains a continuum of identical firms that are perfectly competitive profit
maximizers. According to Cobb–Douglas technology, they produce a final good Yt us-
ing two inputs: aggregate physical capital Kt and aggregate human capital Ht ≡ Ntht.
Aggregate output is given by
Yt = A (Kt)
α (Ht)
1−α ,
where A(> 0) is a scale parameter and α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital share.
Hereafter, we denote by xˆt the ratio of Xt to aggregate human capital, Ht, and by xt
the per capita Xt : xˆt ≡ Xt/Ht and xt ≡ Xt/Nt. Thus, kˆt ≡ Kt/Ht denotes the ratio of
physical to human capital. The first-order conditions for profit maximization with respect
to Ht and Kt are
wt = (1− α)A
(
kˆt
)α
, (3)
ρt = αA
(
kˆt
)α−1
, (4)
where wt and ρt are labor wages and the rental price of capital, respectively. The con-
ditions state that firms hire human and physical capital until the marginal products are
equal to the factor prices. Capital is assumed to depreciate fully within each period.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Public education expenditure is financed by both taxes on capital and labor income and
public bond issues. Let Bt denote aggregate inherited debt. The government budget
constraint in period t is
Bt+1 + τ
k
t Rtst−1Nt−1 + τtwthtNt = Nt+1xt + RtBt,
where Bt+1 is newly issued public bonds, τ
k
t Rtst−1Nt−1 is aggregate capital tax revenue,
τtwthtNt is aggregate labor tax revenue, Nt+1xt is aggregate expenditure on public edu-
cation, and RtBt is debt repayment. We assume a one-period debt structure to derive
analytical solutions from the model. We also assume that the government in each period
is committed to not repudiating the debt.
By dividing both sides of the above expression by Nt, we obtain a per-capita form of
the constraint:
(1 + n)bt+1 + τ
k
t Rt
st−1
1 + n
+ τtwtht = (1 + n)xt +Rtbt, (5)
where bt ≡ Bt/Nt is per-capita public debt.
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2.4 Economic Equilibrium
Public bonds are traded in the domestic capital market. The market-clearing condition
for capital is Bt+1 + Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality of total savings by the
middle-aged population in period t, Ntst, to the sum of the stocks of aggregate public
debt and aggregate physical capital at the beginning of period t+1, Bt+1+Kt+1. By using
kˆt+1 ≡ Kt+1/Ht+1, ht+1 = Ht+1/Nt+1, and the savings function in (2), we can rewrite the
condition as
(1 + n)
(
kˆt+1ht+1 + bt+1
)
=
β
1 + β
(1− τt)wtht. (6)
The following defines the economic equilibrium in the present model.
Definition 1. Given a sequence of policies,
{
τ kt , τt, xt
}∞
t=0
, an economic equilibrium is
a sequence of allocations
{
ct, dt, st, kˆt+1, bt+1, ht+1
}∞
t=0
and prices {ρt, wt, Rt}∞t=0 with
the initial conditions kˆ0(> 0), b0(≥ 0) and h0(> 0), such that (i) given
(
wt, Rt+1, τ
k
t , τt, xt
)
,
(ct, dt+1, st) solves the utility maximization problem; (ii) given (wt, ρt), kˆt solves a
firm’s profit maximization problem; (iii) given (wt, ht, Rt, bt) ,
(
τ kt , τt, xt, bt+1
)
satis-
fies the government budget constraint; (iv) an arbitrage condition ρt = Rt holds;
and (v) the capital market clears: (1 + n) ·
(
kˆt+1ht+1 + bt+1
)
= st.
In the economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of the middle-aged population in
period t, V Mt , and that of the old population in period t, V
o
t , can be expressed as functions
of fiscal policy, physical and human capital, and public debt as follows:
V Mt = (1 + β) ln(1− α)A
(
kˆt
)α
ht (1− τt) + β lnR
(
kˆt+1
)
+ β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
)
+ φM , (7)
V ot = ln
(
1− τ kt
)
+ φO
(
kˆt, ht, bt
)
, (8)
where R
(
kˆt+1
)
≡ αA ·
(
kˆt+1
)α−1
is the gross return from investment in physical capital,
and φM and φO
(
kˆt, ht, bt
)
, including policy-irrelevant and constant terms, are defined by
φM ≡
(
ln
1
1 + β
+ β ln
β
1 + β
)
+ β lnαA,
φO
(
kˆt, ht, bt
)
≡ lnαA
(
kˆt
)α−1
(1 + n)
(
kˆtht + bt
)
,
respectively.
3 Political Equilibrium
In this section, we consider voting on fiscal policy. In particular, we employ probabilistic
voting a` la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In this voting scheme, there is electoral com-
petition between two office-seeking candidates. Each candidate announces a set of fiscal
8
policies subject to the government budget constraint. As demonstrated by Persson and
Tabellini (2000), the two candidates’ platforms converge in the equilibrium to the same
fiscal policy that maximizes the weighted average utility of voters.
In the present framework, the young, middle-aged, and elderly have an incentive to
vote. While the young may benefit from current public education expenditure through
human capital accumulation, we assume that their preferences are not taken into account
by politicians. We impose this assumption, which is often used in the literature (e.g.,
Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2016),
for tractability reasons. However, the assumption could be supported in part by the fact
that a large number of the young are below the voting age.
Thus, the political objective is defined as the weighted sum of the utility of the middle-
aged and old, given by Ω˜t ≡ ωV ot + (1+ n)(1−ω)V Mt , where ω ∈ (0, 1) and 1−ω are the
political weights placed on the old and middle-aged in period t, respectively. The weight
on the middle-aged is adjusted by the gross population growth rate, (1 + n), to reflect
their share of the population. To gain the intuition, we divide Ω˜t by (1 + n)(1 − ω) and
redefine the objective function as follows:
Ωt =
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)V
o
t + V
M
t ,
where the coefficient ω/(1+n)(1−ω) of V ot represents the relative political weight on the
old.
We substitute V Mt in (7) and V
o
t in (8) into Ωt and obtain
Ωt ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ln
(
1− τ kt
)
+ (1 + β) ln (1− α)A
(
kˆt
)α
ht (1− τt)
+ β lnR
(
kˆt+1
)
+ β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
)
. (9)
We use the notation ≃ because irrelevant terms are omitted from the expression of Ωt.
With the use of (3)–(6), we can reformulate the expression in (9) as follows:
Ωt ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ln
(
1− τ kt
)
+ (1 + β) lnZ
(
τ kt , xt, bt+1, kˆt, bt, ht
)
+β lnR
(
Kˆ
(
bt+1, xt, Z
(
τ kt , xt, bt+1, kˆt, bt, ht
)))
+ β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
)
, (10)
where Z (·) , Kˆ (·) , and R (·) represent the after-tax income of the middle-aged, the next-
period ratio of physical to human capital, and the gross return from investment in physical
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capital, respectively. With (3)–(6), they are defined as follows:
Z(τ kt , xt, bt+1, kˆt, bt, ht) ≡ A
(
kˆt
)α
ht −
(
1− τ kt
)
αA
(
kˆt
)α−1 (
kˆtht + bt
)
− (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)bt+1,
Kˆ
(
bt+1, xt, Z
(
τ kt , xt, bt+1, kˆt, bt, ht
))
≡
β
1+β
Z (·)− (1 + n)bt+1
(1 + n)D(xt)η
,
R
(
Kˆ (·)
)
≡ αA
(
Kˆ (·)
)α−1
.
The political objective function in (10) suggests that the current policy choice affects
the decision on future policy via physical and human capital accumulation. In particular,
the period t choices of τ kt , xt, and bt+1 affect the formation of physical and human capital
in period t + 1. This in turn influences the decision making on period-t + 1 fiscal policy.
To demonstrate such an intertemporal effect, we employ the concept of a Markov-perfect
equilibrium under which fiscal policy today depends on the current payoff-relevant state
variables.
In the present framework, the payoff-relevant state variables are the ratio of physical
to human capital, kˆt, public debt, bt, and human capital, ht. Thus, the expected rate
of capital income tax for the next period, τ kt+1, is given by the function of the period-
t + 1 state variables, τ kt+1 = T
k
(
kˆt+1, bt+1, ht+1
)
. We denote by −τ(< 0) and −τ k(< 0)
the arbitrary lower limits of τ and τ k, respectively. By using recursive notation with z′
denoting the next period z, we can now define a Markov-perfect political equilibrium in
the present framework as follows.
Definition 2. A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions, ⟨T, T k, X,B⟩,
where T : ℜ3+ → (−τ , 1) is a labor income tax rule, τ = T (kˆ, b, h), T k : ℜ3+ →(−τ k, 1) is a capital income tax rule, τ k = T k(kˆ, b, h), X : ℜ3+ → ℜ+ is a public
education expenditure rule, x = X(kˆ, b, h), and B : ℜ3+ → ℜ+ is a public debt rule,
b′ = B(kˆ, b, h), so that given kˆ, b, and h, ⟨T (kˆ, b, h), T k(kˆ, b, h), X(kˆ, b, h), B(kˆ, b, h)⟩
is a solution to the following problem:
maxΩ
s.t. (1 + n)
(
kˆ′h′ +B(kˆ, b, h)
)
=
β
1 + β
(
1− T (kˆ, b, h)
)
(1− α)A
(
kˆ
)α
h, (11)
(1 + n)B(kˆ, b, h) + T (kˆ, b, h) (1− α)A
(
kˆ
)α
h+ T k(kˆ, b, h)αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
= (1 + n)X(kˆ, b, h) + αA
(
kˆ
)α−1
b, (12)
h′ = D(h)1−η
(
X(kˆ, b, h)
)η
,
where Ω is defined by (10), and the first, second, and third constraints are the
capital market-clearing condition, government budget constraint, and human capital
formation function, respectively.
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Two remarks are in order. First, Definition 2 allows the tax rates to be negative.
However, the following analysis shows that the capital income tax rate from period 1
onward is positive. Second, the state variables do not line up in compact sets because
they grow across periods. To define the equilibrium more precisely, we need to redefine the
equilibrium as a mapping from a compact set to a compact set by introducing the following
notations: x˜t ≡ xt/A
(
kˆt
)α
ht and b˜t+1 ≡ bt+1/A
(
kˆt
)α
ht. However, for simplicity of the
exposition, we define the equilibrium as in Definition 2.
3.1 Characterization of the Political Equilibrium
To obtain the set of policy functions in Definition 2, we conjecture the following capital
tax rate in the next period:
τ k′ = 1− T kun
1
α
(
1 + b
′
kˆ′h′
) , (13)
where T kun(> 0) is constant. The subscript “un” means that the public debt issue is
“unconstrained.” In the next section, we consider the case in which the public debt issue
is “constrained” by a constitutional rule and compare it with the unconstrained case.
Given the conjecture in (13), we consider the maximization of Ω in (10). The first-order
conditions with respect to b′, τ k, and x are as follows:
b′ : 1+β
Z
∂Z
∂b′
(b.1) (+)
+ β
R
∂R
∂Kˆ
(
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂b′
(b.2) (-)
+ ∂Kˆ
∂b′
(b.3) (+)
)
+ β
1−τk′
{
∂(1−τk′)
∂Kˆ
[
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂b′
(b.4) (+)
+ ∂Kˆ
∂b′
(b.5) (-)
]
+
∂(1−τk′)
∂b′
(b.6) (-)
}
≤ 0,
(14)
τ k : − ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
1
1−τk
(k.1) (-)
+ 1+β
Z
∂Z
∂τk
(k.2) (+)
+ β
R
∂R
∂Kˆ
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂τk
(k.3) (-)
+ β
1−τk′
∂(1−τk′)
∂Kˆ
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂τk
(k.4) (+)
= 0, (15)
x : 1+β
Z
∂Z
∂x
(x.1) (-)
+ β
R
∂R
∂Kˆ
(
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂x
(x.2) (+)
+ ∂Kˆ
∂x
(x.3) (+)
)
+ β
1−τk′
{
∂(1−τk′)
∂Kˆ
[
∂Kˆ
∂Z
∂Z
∂x
(x.4) (-)
+ ∂Kˆ
∂x
(x.5) (-)
]
+
∂(1−τk′)
∂h′
∂h′
∂x
(x.6) (+)
}
= 0,
(16)
where a strict inequality holds in (14) if b′ = 0. In these conditions, the symbol (+) ((-))
below each term indicates that the sign of the term is positive (negative). For example,
the symbol (-) beside (b.2) in Eq. (14) implies that the sign of the products of the terms
(β/R)
(
∂R/∂Kˆ
)(
∂Kˆ/∂Z
)
(∂Z/∂b′) is negative.
By using these conditions, we can verify the conjecture in (13) and obtain the following
result.
Proposition 1. A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is characterized by b′ > 0. The
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corresponding policy functions of b′, τ k, x, and τ are as follows:
(1 + n)b′ = BunA
(
kˆ
)α
h,
τ k = 1− T kun
1
α
(
1 + b
kˆh
) ,
(1 + n)x = XunA
(
kˆ
)α
h,
τ = 1− Tun,
where Bun, T
k
un, Xun, and Tun are defined by
Bun ≡ β (1− α)ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] ,
T kun ≡
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] ,
Xun ≡ βη (1− α)ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] ,
Tun ≡ 1 + β
1− α ·
1
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The conditions in (14)–(16) suggest that the following four effects play roles in shaping
policy: the effect on the disposable income of the middle-aged, Z, represented by the terms
(b.1), (k.2), and (x.1); the effect on the tax burden on the old, τ k, represented by the term
(k.1); the general equilibrium effect of physical and human capital through the interest
rate R represented by the terms (b.2), (b.3), (k.3), (x.2), and (x.3); and the disciplining
effect through the capital income tax rate in the next period, τ k′, represented by the terms
(b.4), (b.5), (b.6), (k.4), (x.4), (x.5), and (x.6).
To understand how these effects arise, recall the first-order condition with respect to
b′ in (14). The condition indicates that the public debt issue creates a crowding-out effect
on physical capital and thus raises the return from savings, R, as presented by the term
(b.3). However, under the conjecture in (13), it also raises the next-period capital income
tax burden, τ k′, as presented by the terms (b.5) and (b.6). The public debt issue enables
the government to cut labor income tax on the middle-aged. This lowers their tax burden
and thus increases their lifetime consumption as represented by the term (b.1). At the
same time, it increases the saving of the middle-aged and the ratio of physical to human
capital, and thus lowers the next-period capital income tax burden represented by the
term (b.4). However, an increase in the physical-to-human capital ratio lowers the return
from saving, R, as presented by the term (b.2). To summarize, three marginal benefits,
represented by the terms (b.1), (b.3), and (b.4), and three marginal costs, represented by
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the terms (b.2), (b.5), and (b.6), arise from the public debt issue. The sum of the former
outweigh the sum of the latter in the present framework. Therefore, the government finds
it optimal to issue public debt.
Next, recall the first-order condition with respect to τ k in (15) to consider the for-
mation of the policy function of the capital income tax rate. The term (k.1) shows the
marginal cost of taxation for the old; raising the tax rate increases their tax burden and
thus lowers their consumption. The terms (k.2)–(k.4) present the marginal cost or benefit
for the middle-aged. The government can cut the labor income tax rate and thus lower
the tax burden on the middle-aged by raising the capital income tax rate. This creates a
positive income effect on the consumption of the middle-aged, as presented by the term
(k.2). In addition, it creates a positive income effect on saving and physical capital forma-
tion and thus lowers the capital income tax burden in the next period, τ k′, as presented
by the term (k.4). However, at the same time, it lowers the return from saving, R, as
presented by the term (k.3). Therefore, there are two marginal benefits, presented by the
terms (k.2) and (k.4), and two marginal costs, presented by the terms (k.1) and (k.3).
The capital income tax rate is found to balance these costs and benefits.
Finally, recall the first-order conditions with respect to x in (16) to consider the
formation of the policy function of public education expenditure. By comparing (14) with
(16), we find that the effects of a decrease in public debt issues are qualitatively equivalent
to the effects of an increase in public education expenditure. Thus, the government chooses
the expenditure to balance the sum of the marginal benefits, represented by the terms
(x.2), (x.3), and (x.6), and the sum of the marginal costs, represented by the terms (x.1),
(x.4), and (x.5). Given the policy functions of b′, x, and τ k, the labor income tax rate τ
is found to satisfy the government budget constraint.
These four effects play roles in shaping policy as described above. In particular, the
main driving forces are the general equilibrium and disciplining effects. To understand
better how these two effects work in the model, let us consider how the results would
change if either or both of them are not included in the model. Firstly, consider the
economy in the absence of the general equilibrium effect: there is no effect of Kˆ on the
interest rate, R: ∂R/∂Kˆ = 0. Examples of such a case include small open economies with
constant interest rates and economies with constant marginal products of capital such as
AK technology. In this economy, the terms (b.2) and (b.3) disappear from the first-order
conditions with respect to b′ in (14). After some calculation, the condition in (14) is
reduced to
b′ :
1 + n
Z
− 1 + n
Z − 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
≤ 0,
showing that the optimal solution is a corner solution, b′ = 0. In the absence of the general
equilibrium effect through the interest rate, the negative effects via the terms (b.5) and
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(b.6) outweigh the positive effects via the terms (b.1) and (b.4). Thus, the presence of the
general equilibrium effect induces the government to issue public debt from the viewpoint
of its optimization.
Secondly, consider the economy in the absence of general equilibrium and disciplining
effects. The absence of the latter effect implies that there is no effect of Kˆ, h′, and b′
on the next-period capital income tax rate, τ k′: ∂
(
1− τ k′) /∂Kˆ = ∂ (1− τ k′) /∂h′ =
∂
(
1− τ k′) /∂b′ = 0. An example of such a case includes myopic voters who take future
policy as given. In this economy, the terms (x.2)–(x.6) disappear from the first-order
condition with respect to x in (16). The condition is reduced to
x :
1 + β
Z
∂Z
∂x
≤ 0.
This condition indicates that the government chooses no public spending on education,
x = 0, showing that the economy shuts down in period 1. Thus, the disciplining and
general equilibrium effects are necessary to keep the economy going.
3.2 Steady State
Having established the policy functions, we are now ready to demonstrate the accumula-
tion of physical and human capital. We substitute the policy functions in Proposition 1
into the capital market-clearing condition in (11) and human capital formation function
in (1), and obtain
kˆ′ = ΨK
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]1−η
, (17)
h′
h
= DΨH
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]η
, (18)
where ΨK and ΨH are defined by
ΨK ≡ αβω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
{
(1 + n)D
[
Xun
1 + n
]η}−1
, (19)
and
ΨH ≡
[
Xun
1 + n
]η
, (20)
respectively. Appendix A.2 shows the derivation of (17) and (18).
Given {kˆ0, h0}, the sequence {kˆt, ht} is distinguished by the above two equations in
(17) and (18). A steady state is defined as a political equilibrium with kˆt = kˆt+1. In
other words, the ratio of physical to human capital is constant in a steady state. Eq. (17)
indicates that there is a unique, stable steady state. Along the steady-state path, human
capital evolves according to (18), and the capital income tax rate remains constant as
shown in the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. For ω ∈ (0, 1), the capital income tax rate is
τ k0 = 1− T kun ·
1
α
(
1 + b0/kˆ0h0
) ,
τ kt = 1−
1
1 + (1+n)(1−ω)
ω
[1 + β (α + η (1− α))]
> 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The capital income tax rate for t ≥ 1 is constant along the equilibrium path because
per-capita debt, b, and per-capita physical capital, kˆh = k, increase at the same rate. The
political weight on the old, denoted by ω, is a key factor to determine the capital income
tax rate in the political equilibrium. The old want to reduce their tax burdens because
they obtain no benefit from public education expenditure. This implies that the tax rate
decreases as the political weight on the old increases. In particular, the tax rate becomes
zero as the weight on the old approaches 100%. In other words, the capital income tax
rate remains positive as long as the government attaches some weight to the middle-aged.
Thus, the result in Corollary 1 implies that the presence of generational conflict allows
the government to levy the capital income tax rate on the old.7
4 Fiscal Rules
In the previous section, we considered fiscal policy and economic growth in the absence of
constraints on public bond issues except for the flow budget constraint. In other words,
we assumed no rule on public bond issuance. However, in practice, many countries have
introduced fiscal rules that control public debt (Schaechter et al., 2012; Budina et al.,
2012). In addition, in the present framework, public bond issuance creates a crowding-
out effect on physical capital formation and economic growth, which in turn triggers a
welfare loss for future generations. This observation motivates us to consider the question
of how fiscal rules shape the choice of fiscal policy and affect economic growth and welfare
over time and across generations.
To answer this question, in Section 4.1 we first consider the following alternative
scenario in which the government is prohibited from issuing public bonds and thus its
expenditure is financed solely through taxation. As shown in Proposition 1, in the absence
of the tax-financing rule, the government borrows in the capital market and issues public
7In the other extreme scenario, when the weight on the old, ω, approaches zero, the term (k.1) in Eq.
(15) disappears. Then, the tax rate on capital income is 100% because the marginal benefit in the terms
(k.2) and (k.4) outweighs the marginal cost in the term (k.3). This is confirmed by looking at the term
T
k
un
in Proposition 1. Setting ω = 0, the tax rate on labor income attains the lowest level, while the ratio
of the debt issue to GDP as well as the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP attain the highest
levels, as observed in Tun and Bun in Proposition 1. Thus, fiscal policy is uniquely determined even if
the old do not participate in voting.
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bonds. In other words, it wants to issue public bonds to finance its expenditure, but their
issuance is prohibited when the tax-financing rule is introduced. We then compare the
tax rates, expenditure, and economic growth in the debt-financing case in the previous
section with those in the tax-financing case. We also investigate the welfare consequences
of shifting from debt financing to tax financing.
The requirement for tax financing is somewhat extreme because in reality the govern-
ment is allowed to issue public bonds as long as their issuance is below some debt ceiling.
Hence, in Section 4.2, we overcome this shortcoming by considering an alternative fis-
cal rule for managing the debt issuance-to-GDP ratio widely introduced in developed
countries.
4.1 Tax Financing versus Debt Financing
The policy functions in the tax-financing case are obtained by assuming b′ = 0 in the first-
order conditions with respect to τ k, b′, and x in (15)–(16) (see Appendix A.4). To investi-
gate the differences between the tax-financing and debt-financing cases, we compare their
tax rates, τ k and τ , economic growth, h′/h, and the public education expenditure-to-GDP
ratio, (1 + n)x/y, where y ≡ Y/N is per-capita GDP. The variables in the tax-financing
and debt-financing cases are denoted by the subscripts “tax” and “debt,”respectively.
Proposition 2. Given the initial conditions k0 and b0, tax financing and debt financing
are compared as follows:
τ k0
∣∣
tax
= τ k0
∣∣
debt
; τ kt
∣∣
tax
< τ kt
∣∣
debt
for t ≥ 1; τ |tax > τ |debt ;
(1 + n)x/y|tax = (1 + n)x/y|debt ; and h′/h|tax > h′/h|debt .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In the initial period, the government needs to finance the repayment of outstanding
public debt, b0, regardless of the financing method. Thus, the capital tax rates are equal
in the two financing cases in the initial period. However, from period 1 onward, the
government incurs no repayment costs in the tax-financing case, while it still incurs such
costs in the debt-financing case. Because of this difference, the capital tax rate is lower
in the tax-financing case than in the debt-financing case from period 1.
By contrast, the labor tax rate is higher in the tax-financing case than in the debt-
financing case. When the tax-financing rule is introduced, the government needs to com-
pensate for the loss of revenue from bond issues by raising the labor income tax rate.
An increase in revenue from the labor tax is offset by a decrease in revenue from the
capital tax and public bond issues. Thus, the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio re-
mains unchanged. However, the introduction of tax financing removes the crowding-out
16
effect of public bonds. This positive effect on physical capital enhances human capital
accumulation and economic growth.
The result in Proposition 2 suggests that the shift from debt financing to tax financing
increases the growth rate and benefits future generations, but may worsen the current
middle-aged population because of the increased labor tax burden. We investigate this
welfare implication and obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. (i) The welfare of the initial old population is unaffected; generation
0 is made worse off by shifting from debt financing to tax financing. (ii) There is
a critical period, denoted by tˆ(> 1), such that generation t ≤ tˆ is made worse off,
whereas generation t > tˆ is made better off by shifting from debt financing to tax
financing.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The welfare of the initial old population is unaffected by shifting to tax financing since
their tax burden is unchanged. However, the choice of tax financing has two opposing
effects on current and future generations. Tax financing raises the tax burden of the
middle-aged population as demonstrated in Proposition 2. This lowers their lifetime
income and thus their lifetime utility of consumption. This is the negative effect of
tax financing. However, tax financing removes the crowding-out effect of public bonds
on capital and thus enhances human capital accumulation. This positive effect appears
from generation 1 onward and accumulates over time, but generation 0 cannot enjoy this
benefit. Therefore, generation 0 suffers from a negative effect, whereas distant future
generations benefit from a positive effect that outweighs the negative one.
4.2 Debt Ceiling
This section extends the analysis in the previous section by considering the following debt
rule:
Bt+1
Yt
≤ u¯.
This rule resembles the debt rule that sets an explicit ceiling for public debt as a percentage
of GDP (Schaechter et al., 2012). This is reformulated as
(1 + n)bt+1 ≤ u¯A
(
kˆt
)α
ht, (21)
where u¯ is defined by
u¯ ≡ εBun, ε ∈ [0, 1) ,
and the definition of Bun is provided in Proposition 1. The rule resembles the tax-financing
case in Section 4.1 when ε → 0 and the unconstrained debt-financing case in Section 3
when ε→ 1.
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Debt issuance in the absence of the rule in (21) is given by (1 + n)b′ = BunA
(
kˆ
)α
hˆ,
as demonstrated in Proposition 1. When the debt rule in (21) is introduced, it is always
binding since ε < 1. Thus, the issue of public bonds in the presence of the rule in (21) is
(1 + n)b′ = εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h.
With the use of (1 + n)b′ = εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h, the political objective function in (10) is
reformulated as follows:
Ω ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ln
(
1− τ k)+ (1 + β) lnZ

τ k, x, εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h
1 + n
, kˆ, b, h


+ β lnR

Kˆ

εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h
1 + n
, xt, Z

τ k, x, εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h
1 + n
, kˆ, b, h





+ β ln (1− τ k′) .
(22)
Following the procedure described in Section 3, we consider the maximization of Ω with
respect to τ k and x, and obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. In the presence of the debt rule in (21), a Markov-perfect political
equilibrium is characterized by the following policy functions:
τ k = 1− T kcon
1
α
(
1 + b/kˆh
) ,
(1 + n)x = XconA
(
kˆ
)α
h,
τ = 1− 1
1− α
[
(1 + εBun)−
(
1 +
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
βη (1− α)
)
Xcon
]
,
where Bun is defined in Proposition 1, and T
k
con, Xcon, and the associated variables
18
are defined as
T kcon ≡
1
α
· ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
βη (1− α) ·
H −
√
(H)2 − 4GI
2G
,
Xcon ≡
H −
√
(H)2 − 4GI
2G
,
G ≡
[
1 +
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
βη (1− α)
] [
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
]
> 0,
H ≡ βη (1− α)
[
1 +
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
βη (1− α)
] [
(1 + εBun) +
(
1− εBun
β
)]
+ αβ (1 + εBun) +
(
1− εBun
β
)
> 0,
I ≡ βη (1− α) (1 + εBun)
(
1− εBun
β
)
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Following the procedure described in Section 3, we show the existence and uniqueness
of steady-state capital. Recall the capital market-clearing condition in (11), which is
rewritten as follows:
kˆ′ =
β
1+β
(1− τ) (1− α)− εBun
(1 + n)D(h)1−η(x)η
A(kˆ)αh
=
β
1+β
(1− τ) (1− α)− εBun
(1 + n)D
(
Xcon
1+n
)η [A(kˆ)α]1−η , (23)
where the first equality comes from the human capital formation function given by h′ =
D(h)1−η(x)η and the second equality comes from the policy function of x presented in
Proposition 5. Eq. (23) indicates that there is unique, stable steady-state capital. In the
next section, we focus on steady states and compare cases in the presence and absence of
the debt rule in (21) in terms of the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio, capital and labor
taxes, and growth rates. We also compare the cases in terms of utility across generations.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
Our task here is to compare cases in the absence and presence of the debt rule in (21)
based on numerical methods. Our strategy is to calibrate the model economy such that
the steady-state equilibrium with b > 0 matches some key statistics of average OECD
countries during 1995–2014.8 We fix the share of capital at α = 1/3 following Song,
8Source: World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi (Accessed on
March 3, 2018).
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Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and Lancia and Russo (2016). Each period lasts 30
years; this assumption is standard in quantitative analyses of the two- or three-period
overlapping-generations model (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Lancia and Russo,
2016). Our selection of β is 0.985 per quarter (e.g., Cooley and Quadrini, 2001, 2006).
Since agents in the present model plan over generations that span 30 years, we discount
the future by (0.985)120.
We assume an annual population growth rate of 1.0059, which was the OECD average
during 1995–2014. This assumption implies that the net population growth rate for 30
years is (1.0059)30− 1. Following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2016) and Lancia and
Russo (2016), we set ω to 0.48.
For η, we focus on the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the steady state:
Nt+1xt
Yt
= Xun =
βη (1− α)
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] .
Given α = 1/3, β = (0.985)120, 1 + n = (1.0059)30, and ω = 0.48, we can solve this
expression for η by using the average ratio observed in OECD countries of 0.051 and
obtain η = 0.904.
To determine the two productivity parameters, A andD, we normalize the steady-state
wage, w, to unity. Thus, we have w = (1− α)A(k)α = 1, or
(1− α)
[
β
1+β
(1− τ) (1− α)−Bun
(1 + n)
(
Xun
1+n
)η
]α/(1−α(1−η))
(D)−α/(1−α(1−η)) (A)1/(1−α(1−η)) = 1. (24)
We also use the data on the per-capita GDP gross growth rate of 1.02, which was the
OECD average during 1995–2014. We substitute these data and the values of α, β, n, η,
and ω into the following equation expressing the per-capita GDP gross growth rate:
h′
h
=
(
Xun
1 + n
)η [ β
1+β
(1− τ) (1− α)−Bun
(1 + n)
(
Xun
1+n
)η
]αη/(1−α(1−η))
(D)(1−α)/(1−α(1−η)) (A)η/(1−α(1−η))
= (1.02)30. (25)
We solve the two equations, (24) and (25), for A and D, and obtain A = 5.56 and
D = 21.68.
The economy is assumed to be in a steady state in period 0. The initial capital kˆ0 is
computed by solving Eq. (23) for kˆ. The initial value of human capital, h0, is normalized
at h0 = 1. From the result in Section 3, in the absence of any fiscal rule, the ratio b/kˆh in
the steady state is given by b/kˆh = (1− α) /α. Thus, we set b0 at b0 = [(1− α) /α] kˆ0h0
and compare the cases with and without a debt rule for the same initial conditions.
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4.3.1 Comparative statics
We study how the steady-state equilibrium responds to changes in the debt rule in (21). In
particular, we focus on ε. When ε = 1, the equilibrium policy functions and corresponding
economic growth rate coincide with those in the absence of the debt rule as in Section
3. When ε = 0, they coincide with those in the tax-financing case as in Section 4.1.
In the following, we consider a decrease in ε that aims to tighten fiscal discipline and
investigate its impact on fiscal policy, economic growth, and welfare across generations.
Figure 1 plots the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio, labor and capital tax rates, ratio
of physical to human capital, and per-capita growth rate in the steady state, taking ε on
the horizontal axis from 0 to 1.9
[Figure 1 here.]
Fiscal tightening (i.e., a decrease in ε) has the following effects on the education
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Firstly, the government raises the labor tax rate to compensate
for the loss of revenue from public bond issues, as depicted in Panel (a). This lowers the
disposable income of the middle-aged population, which in turn raises the marginal cost of
public education expenditure in terms of utility. This is a negative effect of fiscal discipline
on public education expenditure. Secondly, a decrease in disposable income leads to less
saving and thus a lower ratio of physical to human capital. At the same time, fiscal
tightening reduces the crowding-out effect of public debt. The net effect on the ratio of
physical to human capital is positive, as shown in Panel (b), implying a negative effect on
the interest rate. This general equilibrium effect through the interest rate in turn gives the
government an incentive to increase public education expenditure because the increase in
expenditure reduces savings and thus works to increase the interest rate. In sum, the two
opposing effects on the choice of public education expenditure produce an initial increase
in the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio followed by a decrease, as depicted in Panel
(c).
Next, consider the effect of fiscal tightening on the choice of the capital tax rate.
Firstly, this raises the marginal benefit of capital taxation. This positive effect parallels
the effect on the choice of public education expenditure as described above. However,
an additional effect on the marginal benefit arises through the term bˆ/kh in the policy
function of τ k. Fiscal tightening lowers the ratio bˆ/kh and thus produces a negative effect
on the marginal benefit. This negative effect outweighs the positive effect. Therefore, the
government chooses a lower capital tax rate to balance the marginal cost and benefit as ε
decreases, as depicted in Panel (d). In other words, fiscal tightening shifts the tax burdens
9In Figure 1, each panel illustrates two cases, ω = 0.48 and 0.2. The analysis here is restricted to the
case of ω = 0.48. The case of ω = 0.2 is discussed in Section 5.
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from the old to the middle-aged. Finally, fiscal tightening raises the per-capita growth rate
as shown in Panel (e) because the positive effects through the increased ratio of physical
to human capital and decreased capital tax rate outweigh the negative effect through the
increased labor tax and non-monotone effect through public education expenditure.
4.3.2 Comparative dynamics
The comparative static analysis shows that the physical-to-human capital ratio and steady-
state growth rate increase as ε decreases. This finding suggests that future generations
benefit from increased physical and human capital. However, are all generations made
better off by fiscal tightening? To answer this question, Figure 2 plots the trends of the
key indicators from the initial old population for three scenarios, ε = 0, 0.5, and 0.7. In
Panels (a)–(e), we take the ratio of a variable in the presence of the debt ceiling to that
in its absence for each period. The lines in each panel imply the ratio of the concerned
variable in the presence of the debt ceiling to that in its absence. Each ratio implies that
the presence of the debt ceiling outweighs its absence when the ratio is above unity. In
Panel (f), we plot the difference in utility between the presence and absence of the debt
ceiling from generation -1 to generation 4. Generation t attains higher (lower) utility in
the presence of the debt ceiling than in its absence when the difference is positive (nega-
tive). The figure indicates that the initial old population as well as generation 1 onward
are made better off by the introduction of the debt rule in (21), whereas generation 0 is
made worse off. Thus, fiscal tightening is not Pareto-improving.
[Figure 2 here.]
The mechanism behind the result is straightforward. Under the present assumption,
the government’s optimal choice of the debt-to-GDP ratio is Bun; however, its choice is
limited up to εBun(< Bun) by the rule in (21). Because of this constraint, the government
in period 0 is unable to attain an “interior optimum.” In particular, the constraint hits the
middle-aged population in generation 0. Governments from period 1 are also constrained
by the rule, but they benefit from the higher levels of physical and human capital be-
queathed from past generations. This benefit outweighs the cost of the constraint in (21).
Therefore, the introduction of the debt rule creates a trade-off between generations in
terms of utility.
The effect of decreased ε on utility is monotone from generation 0 onward, as shown in
Figure 2. However, the effect is non-monotone for the initial old population. In particular,
the decrease in ε from 1.0 to 0.5 improves their utility, but a further decrease worsens it.
This non-monotone effect stems from the initial decrease followed by an increase in the
period 0 capital tax rate, as depicted in Figure 3. The U-shaped pattern of the period
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0 capital tax rate parallels the hump-shaped pattern of public education expenditure
described above.
[Figure 3 here.]
Finally, we consider the case in which the debt rule is imposed only for limited pe-
riods. In particular, the debt rule in (21) is introduced in period 2, but terminated at
the end of period 2, 3, or 4, meaning that successive governments from the termination
period onward are free to choose policies with no rule. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of
this temporary implementation of the fiscal rule on fiscal policies, the ratio of physical
to human capital, per-capita human capital, per-capita GDP, consumption, and utility
across generations when ε = 0.5. As might be expected, the rule produces a tempo-
rary effect on fiscal policies, the physical-to-human capital ratio, and per-capita GDP.
However, it has a long-lasting effect on utility across generations owing to the increased
human capital bequeathed from generation to generation. This long-lasting effect of the
temporary rule, which was not shown by Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016), is caused by
human capital accumulation stimulated by debt-financed public education expenditure.
Therefore, this result suggests the importance of connecting seemingly unrelated subjects,
public education and public debt, to consider the impact of a debt rule over time and
across generations.
[Figure 4 here.]
5 Planner’s Allocation
In the previous section, we use the Pareto criterion to evaluate the welfare consequence
of the debt rule. Here, we take an alternative approach by deriving an optimal allocation
that maximizes an infinite discounted sum of generational utilities for an arbitrary social
discount factor. In particular, we consider a benevolent planner who can commit to all
his or her choices at the beginning of a period, subject to the human capital formation
function and the resource constraint. Assuming such a planner, we evaluate the political
equilibrium in the presence and absence of the debt ceiling by comparing it with the
planner’s allocation in terms of consumption, per-capita GDP, and welfare over time and
across generations.
The planner is assumed to value the welfare of all generations. In particular, his or
her objective is to maximize a discounted sum of the lifecycle utility of all current and
future generations:
SW =
∞∑
t=−1
γtUt, 0 < γ < 1,
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under the human capital formation function in (1) and the resource constraint:
Ntct +Nt−1dt +Kt+1 +Nt+1xt = A (Kt)
α (Ht)
1−α ,
or
ct +
dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)kˆt+1ht+1 + (1 + n)xt = A
(
kˆt
)α
ht,
where kˆ0 and h0 are given. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is the planner’s discount factor. Re-
verse discounting, 1/γ(> 1), must be applied to U−1 (i.e., the utility of the old generation
in the initial period) to preserve dynamic consistency.
Solving the problem leads to the following characterization of the planner’s allocation.
Proposition 5. Given kˆ0 and h0, a sequence of the planner’s allocation,
{
ct, dt, xt, kˆt+1, ht+1
}∞
t=0
,
satisfies the human capital formation function in (1) and the following:
ct =
γ (1− γ) [1− αγ (1− η)]
(γ + β) [1− γ (1− η)] A
(
kˆt
)α
ht,
dt
1 + n
=
β (1− γ) [1− αγ (1− η)]
(γ + β) [1− γ (1− η)] A
(
kˆt
)α
ht,
(1 + n)kˆt+1 =
αγ
D
[
γη(1−α)
(1+n)[1−γ(1−η)]
]η [A(kˆt)α]1−η ,
(1 + n)xt =
(1− α) γη
1− γ (1− η)A
(
kˆt
)α
ht.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
In the following, we compare the planner’s allocation with the political equilibrium
using numerical methods. The parameter values for the analysis are the same as those in
Section 4.3 if not otherwise specified.
5.1 Comparison between the Planner’s Allocation and Political
Equilibrium in the Absence of the Debt Ceiling
We first compare the planner’s allocation with the political equilibrium in the absence of
the debt ceiling. In Figure 5, we assume γ = (0.985)120 = β in the planner’s allocation, and
plot the trends of physical capital (Panel (a)), human capital (Panel (b)), per-capita GDP
(Panel (c)), consumption in middle age (Panel (d)), and consumption in old age (Panel
(e)) from period t = 0 to 8. We take the ratio of the variable at the political equilibrium to
that in the planner’s allocation for each period. The lines in each figure address the ratio
of the concerned variable at the political equilibrium to that in the planner’s allocation.
Each ratio implies that the political equilibrium outweighs the planner’s allocation when
the ratio is above unity. In Panel (f), we plot the difference in utility between the political
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equilibrium and planner’s allocation from generation −1 to generation 4. Generation t
attains higher (lower) utility at the political equilibrium than in the planner’s allocation
when the difference is positive (negative).
[Figure 5 here.]
The planner’s allocation attains higher physical and human capital and higher per-
capita GDP than at the political equilibrium, as depicted in Panels (a), (b), and (c) of
Figure 5. The share of resources devoted to education is higher in the planner’s allocation
than at the political equilibrium because the long-lived planner has an incentive to invest
more in education than short-lived politicians. Investment in education stimulates human
capital formation and increases the output and resources devoted to physical capital
formation in the planner’s allocation. Therefore, the planner’s allocation attains higher
physical and human capital and per-capita GDP than the political equilibrium from period
1 onward.
The argument above implies that the share of resources devoted to consumption is
lower in the planner’s allocation than at the political equilibrium. Because of this property,
middle- and old-age consumption levels in period 0 are lower in the planner’s allocation
than at the political equilibrium (see Panels (d) and (e)). However, the available resources
in the planner’s allocation are larger than at the political equilibrium from period 1
onward. Because of this positive income effect, the planner’s allocation attains higher
levels of consumption for the middle-aged and old from period 1 onward than the political
equilibrium (see Panels (d) and (e)). These results imply that generations -1 and 0 are
made better off in the political equilibrium than in the planner’s allocation, whereas agents
from generation 1 onward are made worse off. In other words, short-sighted politicians
produce a trade-off between generations in terms of welfare.
5.2 Comparison between the Planner’s Allocation and Political
Equilibrium in the Presence of the Debt Ceiling
We next compare the planner’s allocation with the political equilibrium in the presence of
the debt ceiling and examine the way of approximating the planner’s allocation through
the control of the parameter ε representing the debt ceiling. As demonstrated above,
generations from t = 1 onward are worse off at the political equilibrium in the absence of
the debt ceiling than in the planner’s allocation. In addition, a change in the debt ceiling,
ε, creates intergenerational trade-offs in terms of utility, as shown in Section 4. These
results imply that all generations from t = 1 onward may benefit from strengthening
fiscal discipline (i.e., lowering ε) at the expense of generation t = 0. However, the sum
of the benefits of all future generations may outweigh the cost incurred by generation
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t = 0, suggesting a rationale for focusing on generations from t = 1 onward. Therefore,
we hereafter consider the effect of the debt ceiling on generations from t = 1 onward.
The planner’s allocation is compared with the two cases of the political equilibrium:
high political weight on the old, ω = 0.48, called an aging society, and low political weight
on the old, ω = 0.2, called a young society. The debt ceiling in the political equilibrium
has three scenarios: tight discipline, ε = 0, moderate discipline, ε = 0.5, and lax discipline,
ε = 0.7. We consider these three cases of the debt ceiling as well as the case of the absence
of the debt ceiling, ε = 1, and compare them with the planner’s allocation. In particular,
we explore the condition for the planner’s allocation to be approached by the adjustment
of the debt ceiling.
Figure 6 depicts the numerical results. The figure contains two subfigures: the upper
(lower) subfigure compares the planner’s allocation with the political equilibrium when
ω = 0.48 (0.2). Following Figure 5, we plot the trends of the physical-to-human capital
ratio (Panel (a)), human capital (Panel (b)), per-capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age
consumption (Panel (d)), old-age consumption (Panel (e)), and the distribution of utility
across generations (Panel (f)).
[Figure 6 here.]
First, suppose that the political weight on the old is high such that ω = 0.48 holds (see
the upper panels of Figure 6). Politicians are incentivized to invest a little in human capital
formation. This weak incentive implies that generations from t = 1 onward experience
lower levels of human capital, per-capita GDP, and middle- and old-age consumption at
the political equilibrium than in the planner’s allocation regardless of the debt ceiling,
ε. However, they increase in the political equilibrium as the debt ceiling, ε, is lowered.
Thus, the political equilibrium can close the gap to the planner’s allocation in an aging
society by strengthening fiscal discipline.
Second, suppose that the political weight on the old is low such that ω = 0.2 (see
the lower panels of Figure 6). Politicians in this case have more incentive to invest in
human capital than in the first case. Because of this property, the political equilibrium
may overcome the planner’s allocation in terms of human capital, per-capita GDP, and
consumption. This overcoming effect in the political equilibrium increases as the debt
ceiling is lowered. This in turn implies that in the young society with ω = 0.2, the political
equilibrium may outweigh the planner’s allocation in terms of the utility of generations
from t = 1 onward. In particular, the gap between the political equilibrium and planner’s
allocation shrinks as the debt ceiling, ε, is lowered when the initial ε is high, while the gap
widens when the initial ε is low. This result suggests that strengthening fiscal discipline
is not necessarily beneficial from the planner’s viewpoint in a young society.
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The results described thus far indicate that the political equilibrium may approximate
the planner’s allocation by controlling the debt ceiling, ε, but its realization depends on
the political weight on the old, ω, as well as the initial condition of the debt ceiling,
ε. When the political weight on the old, ω, is high such that ω = 0.48, lowering the
debt ceiling enables us to close the gap to the planner’s allocation. However, in a young
society such that ω = 0.2 holds, lowering the debt ceiling is beneficial from the planner’s
viewpoint when the initial ε is high, whereas it is detrimental when the initial ε is low.
Therefore, the political power of the old, ω, as well as the initial condition of the debt
ceiling, ε, matter when we evaluate the effect of strengthening fiscal discipline from the
planner’s viewpoint.
6 Public Good Provision
Thus far, we have assumed that the old do not enjoy any public expenditure. However,
when they directly benefit from public expenditure such as public good provision, they
may induce politicians to raise public expenditure for them as well as place a fiscal burden
onto future generations by issuing more public debt. This section examines this possibility.
For the analysis, consider the following utility function:
Ut = ln ct + θ ln gt + β [ln dt+1 + θ ln gt+1] , (26)
where g is the per-capita public good provision and θ(> 0) is the weight on the utility of
public good provision. Aggregate public good expenditure in period t is (Nt +Nt−1) gt,
making the government budget constraint become
(1 + n)bt+1 + τ
k
t Rt
st−1
1 + n
+ τtwtht = (1 + n)xt +
2 + n
1 + n
gt +Rtbt. (27)
We assume no public debt rule.
In this setting, the political objective function in (10) is reformulated as follows:
Ωg ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)
[
ln
(
1− τ k)+ θ ln g]+ (1 + β) ln [Z (τ k, x, b′, kˆ, b, h)− 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
+ β lnR
(
Kˆ
(
b′, x, Z
(
τ k, x, b′, kˆ, b, h
)))
+ β ln
(
1− τ k′)+ θ ln g + βθ ln g′,
where Ωg denotes the political objective function in the presence of public good provision.
The function Ωg differs from the function in the baseline model, Ω, in that (i) after-tax
income Z(·) is replaced by Z(·) − (2 + n)g/(1 + n) and (ii) the utility of public good
provision enters additively into the function. Keeping this difference in mind, we solve
the problem of the government and obtain the following policy functions.
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Proposition 6. In the presence of public good provision, a Markov-perfect political
equilibrium is characterized by the following policy functions:
τ k = 1− 1
1 + θ
T kun
1
α
(
1 + b
kˆh
) ,
(1 + n)x = XunA
(
kˆ
)α
h,
τ =
{
1− 1
1+θ
Tun if 1 > α (1 + θ) ,
1− 1
1+θ
· 1+αβ(1+θ)
1+β
Tun if 1 ≤ α (1 + θ) ,
(1 + n)b′ =
{
1
1+θ
· 1−α(1+θ)
1−α
BunA
(
kˆ
)α
h if 1 > α (1 + θ) ,
0 if 1 ≤ α (1 + θ) ,
2 + n
1 + n
g =
θ
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
(1 + θ)
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
]A(kˆ)α h.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Comparing the results in the absence and presence of public good provision (i.e.,
Propositions 1 and 8, respectively), we find that the debt-to-GDP ratio in the presence
of public good provision is lower than that in its absence. The old may thus have an
incentive to pass the burden of public good provision by issuing public debt. However,
the middle-aged, who also benefit from public good provision, find it optimal to reduce
debt issue and increase public good provision in their old age from the viewpoint of their
utility. Because of this disciplined effect (as indicated by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti,
2012), the government representing both the middle-aged and the old finds it optimal to
reduce rather than increase public debt issues.10
To understand the disciplined effect more precisely, consider the first-order condition
with respect to b′, which is given as follows:
∂Ω
∂b′
+
βθ
g′
· ∂g
′
∂Kˆ
·


∂Kˆ
∂
[
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
] · ∂ [Z(·)− 2+n1+ng]
∂b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d.1)
+
∂Kˆ
∂b′︸︷︷︸
(d.2)

 ≤ 0,
where the first term on the left-hand side, denoted by ∂Ω/∂b′, includes all the terms
observed in the absence of public good provision and the second term shows the disciplined
effect in the present case. The disciplined effect is composed of two parts: (i) increased
after-tax income, which in turn increases saving and physical capital and thus raises the
provision of public good in the next period, as presented by the term (d.1), and (ii) the
crowding out of physical capital, which in turn decreases public good provision in the next
10However, this result depends on the specification of the present model.
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period, as presented by the term (d.2). Thus, there are two opposing effects of public
debt issues on the provision of public goods and the net effect is negative in the present
framework. Because of this negative effect, the government reduces public debt issues
as the weight on the public good, denoted by θ, increases. In particular, when θ is high
such that α (1 + θ) ≥ 1 holds, there is no public debt issue; spending is solely financed by
taxation.
7 Conclusion
This study developed an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital
accumulation and analyzed voting on fiscal policy. It considered the effect of debt ceilings
on fiscal policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare over time and across
generations. The efficiency of the debt ceiling was measured based on the Pareto criterion.
It was shown that the introduction of a debt ceiling is not Pareto-improving; it increases
economic growth, but creates a trade-off between generations in terms of welfare.
The study evaluated the debt ceiling from an alternative viewpoint, that is, an imag-
inary benevolent planner who can allocate resources across generations. It was found
that the planner’s allocation can be approached by controlling the debt ceiling. In par-
ticular, under certain conditions, lowering the debt ceiling enables us to approach the
planner’s allocation when the political power of the old is strong, suggesting a rationale
for strengthening fiscal discipline in an aging society.
While the present study shed light on the evaluation of the debt ceiling from the
political economy viewpoint, the analysis could be further extended in several directions.
For instance, the main analysis assumed away public good provision that benefits the
retired old. In Section 6, the case including public good provision was briefly analyzed,
but the evaluation of the debt ceilings in that case was left untouched. In addition, the
analysis focused on the debt ceiling and alternative fiscal rules such as balanced budget
rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules, which are common in many countries, were
left untouched. The exploration of these extensions is left for future work.
29
A Proofs and Supplementary Explanations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The conjecture in (13) is reformulated by using (11) and (12) as follows:
τ k′ = 1− T kun
kˆ′h′
α
(
kˆ′h′ + b′
)
= 1− T kun
A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b)− (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b′ − 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
α
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
− (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b′
]
= 1− T kun
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
αZ(·) . (28)
By using (28) and rearranging the terms, the first-order conditions in (14)–(16) are refor-
mulated as
τ k : − ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)
1
1− τ k +
αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·) +
αβαA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
≤ 0,
(29)
b′ :
1 + n
Z(·) −
α(1 + n)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
≤ 0, (30)
x :
βη (1− α)
x
− 1 + n
Z(·) −
αβ(1 + n)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
= 0. (31)
Suppose that b′ = 0 holds. Eq. (30) implies that b′ = 0 if (1 + n)−α(1 + n) ≤ 0, that
is, if (1− α) /α ≤ 0, which never holds ∀α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we obtain b′ > 0.
Given that b′ > 0 holds, the first-order condition with respect to b′ in (30) holds with
an equality. From (30) and (31), we obtain
(1 + β) (1 + n)
Z
=
βη (1− α)
x
. (32)
From (29) and (31), we have
αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
) (
1− τ k) = ω(1+n)(1−ω)
βη (1− α)(1 + n)x. (33)
We substitute (33) into the first-order condition with respect to b′ in (30). After
rearranging the terms, we obtain the following relation between x and b′ :
(1− α)
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
h−
(
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
βη (1− α) + 1
)
(1 + n)x
]
=
(
α +
1
β
)
(1 + n)b′. (34)
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We can obtain another relation between x and b′ by substituting (33) into (32):
(1 + n)b′ =
[
1 + β
βη (1− α) + 1 +
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
βη (1− α)
]
(1 + n)x− A
(
kˆ
)α
h. (35)
By solving (34) and (35) for x and b′, we obtain the policy functions of x and b′ as in
Proposition 1.
We substitute the obtained policy function, X, into (33) to derive
1− τ k =
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] ·
1
α
(
1 + b
kˆh
) .
Finally, we can compute the labor tax rate by substituting the obtained τ k, x, and b′ into
the government budget constraint in (12).
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A.2 Derivation of (17) and (18)
Recall the human capital formation function, h′ = D(x)η(h)1−η. With the use of the
policy function of x in Proposition 1, this function is rewritten as
h′
h
= D
[
1
1 + n
βη (1− α)
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
]η [
A
(
kˆ
)α]η
, (36)
or,
h′
h
= DΨH
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]η
,
where ΨH is defined as in (20).
Next, consider the capital market-clearing condition in (11). With the use of the policy
function of τ in Proposition 1, (11) is rewritten as
(1 + n)kˆ′h′ =
αβ
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]A
(
kˆ
)α
h. (37)
By substituting (36) into (37) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
kˆ′ =
αβ
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
{
(1 + n)D
[
Xun
1 + n
]η}−1 [
A
(
kˆ
)α]1−η
, (38)
which is reduced as in (17).
■
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Recall the policy function of τ k in Proposition 1. The tax rate in period 0 is immediately
obtained by setting t = 0. For the proof of the tax rate in period t ≥ 1, consider the ratio
bt/kˆtht in period t ≥ 1. We use the capital market-clearing condition in (11) and policy
functions in Proposition 1 to reformulate the ratio bt/kˆtht for t ≥ 1 as follows:
bt
kˆtht
=
1
1+n
BunA
(
kˆt−1
)α
ht−1
1
1+n
β
1+β
(1− τt−1) (1− α)A
(
kˆt−1
)α
ht−1 − bt
=
1
1+n
BunA
(
kˆt−1
)α
ht−1
1
1+n
β
1+β
1+β
1−α
1
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+1+β[α+η(1−α)]
(1− α)A
(
kˆt−1
)α
ht−1 − 11+nBunA
(
kˆt−1
)α
ht−1
=
1− α
α
.
By using this result, we can reformulate τ kt , t ≥ 1, as
τ kt = 1− T kun
1
α
(
1 + 1−α
α
)
= 1− 1
1 + (1+n)(1−ω)
ω
{1 + β [α + η (1− α)]}
.
■
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
When b′ = 0, the first-order conditions with respect to τ k in (49) and x in (50) are
rewritten as
τ k :
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)
1
1− τ k =
αA
(
kˆ
)α−1
(1 + α)
(
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·) , (39)
x :
βη (1− α)
(1 + n)x
=
(1 + n)(1 + αβ)
Z(·) , (40)
respectively. From (39) and (40), we obtain
(1 + n)x =
(1 + n)(1− ω)
ω
βη (1− α)αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
) (
1− τ k) . (41)
We substitute (41) into (39) and rearrange the terms to obtain
τ k = 1− TKun
1
α
(
1 + b
kˆh
) . (42)
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This is identical to the corresponding policy function in the debt-financing case. By
plugging (42) into (39), we obtain the policy function of X as
(1 + n)x = XunA
(
kˆ
)α
h.
This is also identical to the corresponding policy function in the debt-financing case.
We can obtain the labor income tax rate by substituting the policy functions of τ k, x,
and b′ = 0 into the government budget constraint in (12) as follows:
τ = 1− 1
1− α
1 + αβ
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)] .
This differs from the corresponding policy function in the debt-financing case.
Finally, the accumulation of physical and human capital is computed by substituting
the policy functions into the capital market-clearing condition in (1) and the human
capital formation function in (11):
kˆ′ = ΨK,b′=0
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]1−η
,
h′
h
= DΨH
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]η
,
where ΨH is defined in (20) and ΨK,b′=0 is
ΨK,b′=0 ≡ β
1 + β
1 + αβ
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
{
(1 + n)D
[
Xun
1 + n
]η}−1
.
To compare the two cases, consider first the capital tax rates. Given kˆ0 and b0, we
immediately find that τ k0
∣∣
tax
= τ k0
∣∣
debt
holds. For t ≥ 1, τ kt
∣∣
tax
< τ kt
∣∣
debt
holds because
b/kˆh = 0(> 0) holds in the tax-financing (debt-financing) case.
Next, compare the labor tax rates with the growth rates. This direct comparison leads
to
τ |tax > τ |debt ⇔ 0 <
1− α
α
,
and
h′/h|tax > h′/h|debt ⇔ 0 <
1− α
α
.
Finally, we immediately obtain (1 + n)x/y|tax = (1 + n)x/y|debt from Proposition 1.
■
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Recall the indirect utility function of the old given by (8). Because τ k0
∣∣
tax
= τ k0
∣∣
debt
holds as demonstrated in Proposition 2, we immediately obtain V o0 |tax = V o0 |debt.
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To consider the effect on the utility of generation 0, V M0 , recall the political objective
function in period 0:
Ω0 =
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)V
o
0 + V
M
0 .
The objective function Ω0 is maximized by choosing b
′ > 0, as shown in Proposition 1.
However, the government choice is constrained when it is forced to finance its expenditure
solely by taxes. That is, the government attains a lower value of its objective under tax
financing than under debt financing: Ω0|tax < Ω0|debt. This implies V M0
∣∣
tax
< V M0
∣∣
debt
since V o0 |tax = V o0 |debt holds.
(ii) Recall the indirect utility function of the middle-aged in (7). Suppose that from
some period t0(≥ 1) onward, the economy is in a steady state regardless of the govern-
ment’s financing method. The indirect utility function in (7) becomes
V Mt
∣∣
j
= (1 + β) ln(1− α)A
(
kˆ
∣∣∣
j
)α (
ht|j
)(
1− τ |j
)
+ β [(α− 1) + γα] ln kˆ
∣∣∣
j
+ β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
∣∣
j
)
+ φM ,
≃ (1 + αβ) ln kˆ
∣∣∣
j
+ (1 + β) ln
(
1− τ |j
)
+ β ln
(
1− τ kt+1
∣∣
j
)
+ (1 + β) ln ht|j , j = tax, debt (43)
where the constant terms are omitted from the expression.
With the use of the policy functions presented in Proposition 1 and Appendix A.4,
(43) is rewritten as follows:
V Mt
∣∣
j
≃ (1 + αβ) ln kˆ
∣∣∣
j
+ (1 + β) ln
(
1− τ |j
)
+ β ln
1
1 +
(
bt+1/kˆt+1ht+1
)∣∣∣
j
+ (1 + β) ln ht|j ,
or
V Mt
∣∣
j
≃ (1 + αβ) ln kˆ
∣∣∣
j
+ (1 + β) ln
(
1− τ |j
)
+ (1 + β) ln
(
h′/h|j
)t−t0
ht0 |j , j = tax, debt.
The direct comparison of V M1
∣∣
tax
and V M1
∣∣
debt
leads to
V M1
∣∣
tax
≷ V M1
∣∣
debt
⇔ (t− t0) (1 + β) ln h
′/h|tax
h′/h|debt
≷ (1 + αβ) ln
kˆ
∣∣∣
debt
kˆ
∣∣∣
tax
+ (1 + β) ln
1− τ |debt
1− τ |tax
+ (1 + β) ln
ht0 |debt
ht0 |tax
, (44)
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where the left-hand and right-hand sides of (44) are denoted by LHS and RHS, respec-
tively. These satisfy the following properties:
∂LHS/∂t > 0, LHS|t=t0 = 0, limt→∞LHS =∞, and ∂RHS/∂t = 0.
Therefore, there is a positive integer, denoted by tˆ, such that LHS ≷ RHS ⇔ V Mt
∣∣
tax
≷
V Mt
∣∣
debt
for t ≷ tˆ.
■
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
With the use of (1 + n)b′ = εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h, the government budget constraint in (12) is
reformulated as
εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h+ τ (1− α)A
(
kˆ
)α
h+ τ kαA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
= (1 + n)x+ αA
(
kˆ
)α−1
b,
and the capital market-clearing condition in (11) is rewritten as
εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h+ (1 + n)kˆ′h′ =
β
1 + β
(1− τ) (1− α)A
(
kˆ
)α
h.
We conjecture the following capital tax rate in the next period:
τ k′ = 1− T kcon
1
α
(
1 + b
′
kˆ′h′
) ,
where the subscript “con” of T kcon implies that the public debt issue is “constrained” by
the rule in (21). By using the capital market-clearing condition and government budget
constraint, we can rewrite the conjecture as follows:
τ k′ = 1− T kcon
(1− τ) (1− α)− 1+β
β
εBun
α (1− τ) (1− α) . (45)
We substitute (45) into the political objective function in (22) and rearrange the terms
to obtain
Ω ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ln
(
1− τ k)+ ln Z˜1 + αβ ln Z˜2 + βη (1− α) ln x, (46)
where
Z˜1 ≡ A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b)− (1 + n)x+ εBunA(kˆ)α h, (47)
Z˜2 ≡ A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b)− (1 + n)x− 1
β
εBun. (48)
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The first-order conditions with respect to τ k and x are
τ k : − ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)
1
1− τ k + αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)[ 1
Z˜1
+
αβ
Z˜2
]
= 0, (49)
x :
βη (1− α)
(1 + n)x
−
[
1
Z˜1
+
αβ
Z˜2
]
= 0. (50)
These conditions are summarized as
1− τ k = ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
(1 + n)x
βη (1− α) ·
1
α
(
1 + b/kˆh
) . (51)
With the use of (51), Z˜1 and Z˜2 in (47) and (48) are rewritten as follows:
 Z˜
1 = (1 + εBun)A
(
kˆ
)α
h−
[
1 + ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
· 1
βη(1−α)
]
(1 + n)x,
Z˜2 = (1 + εBun)A
(
kˆ
)α
h−
[
1 + ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
1
βη(1−α)
]
(1 + n)x− 1+β
β
εBunA
(
kˆ
)α
h.
(52)
The substitution of (52) into the first-order condition with respect to x in (50) leads to
βη (1− α)
(1 + n)x
=
1
Z˜1
+
αβ
Z˜1 − 1+β
β
εBun
. (53)
Figure A.1 illustrates the graph of (53), taking (1 + n)x on the horizontal axis. The
figure indicates that there are two candidates for a solution to (53). However, the larger
one is not feasible since Z˜1 < 0 holds. Therefore, the smaller one is the solution to (53).
[Figure A.1 here.]
To derive the solution to (53), we reformulate (53) as follows:
βη (1− α)
(1 + n)x
=
Z˜1 − 1+β
β
εBun + αβZ˜
1
Z˜1
(
Z˜1 − 1+β
β
εBun
) ,
or
f ((1 + n)x˜) ≡ G ((1 + n)x)2 −H(1 + n)x+ I = 0, (54)
where G, H, and I are defined in Proposition 5. Note that H > 0 and I > 0 hold because
εBun < β holds.
By solving (54) for (1 + n)x and taking the smaller solution, we obtain
(1 + n)x = Xcon ≡
H −
√
(H)2 − 4GI
2G
. (55)
The substitution of (55) into (51) yields
1− τ k = ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
H−
√
(H)2−4GI
2G
βη (1− α) ·
1
α
(
1 + b/kˆh
) , (56)
which verifies the initial guess. Finally, the labor tax rate is derived by substituting (55)
and (56) into the government budget constraint.
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■A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
In the present framework, the state variable ht does not line up in a compact set because
it continues to grow along an optimal path. To reformulate the planner’s problem into
one in which the state variable lines up in a compact set, we undertake the following
normalization:
c˜t ≡ ct/ht, d˜t ≡ dt/ht, x˜t ≡ xt/ht.
Then, the resource constraint, ct + dt/(1 + n) + (1 + n)kˆt+1ht+1 + (1 + n)xt = A
(
kˆt
)α
ht,
is rewritten as
c˜t +
d˜t
1 + n
+ (1 + n)kˆt+1
ht+1
ht
+ (1 + n)x˜t = A
(
kˆt
)α
.
With the use of ht+1 = D (ht)
1−η (xt)
η , this is further reformulated as
c˜t +
d˜t
1 + n
+ (1 + n)kˆt+1D (x˜t)
η + (1 + n)x˜t = A
(
kˆt
)α
. (57)
The utility functions are rewritten as follows:
U−1 = β ln d˜0 + β lnh0,
U0 = ln c˜0 + lnh0 + β ln d˜1 + β lnD (x˜0)
η h0,
U1 = ln c˜1 + lnD (x˜0)
η h0 + β ln d˜2 + β lnDD (x˜0)
η (x˜1)
η h0,
...
Ut = ln c˜t + ln (D)
t (x˜t−1)
η (x˜t−2)
η · · · · · (x˜0)η h0
+ β ln d˜t+1 + β ln (D)
t+1 (x˜t)
η (x˜t−1)
η · · · · · (x˜0)η h0.
...
In particular, generation-t utility is rewritten as
Ut = ln c˜t + β ln d˜t+1 + η (1 + β)
t−1∑
j=0
ln x˜j + ηβ ln x˜t + (1 + β) lnh0 + [t+ β (t+ 1)] lnD.
Thus, by omitting the politically unrelated terms, the social welfare function becomes
SW ≃ β
γ
ln d˜0
+ ln c˜0 + β ln d˜1 + βη ln x˜0
+ γ ·
[
ln c˜1 + β ln d˜2 + (1 + β) η ln x˜0 + ηβ ln x˜1
]
+ γ2 ·
[
ln c˜2 + β ln d˜3 + (1 + β) η ln x˜0 + η (1 + β) ln x˜1 + ηβ ln x˜2
]
+ · · · ,
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that is,
SW ≃
∞∑
t=0
γt ·
{
ln c˜t +
β
γ
ln d˜t + η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
ln x˜t
}
. (58)
By plugging (57) into (58), the planner’s problem becomes
max
∞∑
t=0
γt ·
{
ln
[
A
(
kˆt
)α
− d˜t
1 + n
− (1 + n)kˆt+1D (x˜t)η − (1 + n)x˜t
]
+
β
γ
ln d˜t + η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
ln x˜t
}
given kˆ0.
We can express the Bellman equation for the problem as follows:
V (kˆ) = max
{d˜,x˜,kˆ′}
{
ln
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
− d˜
1 + n
− (1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η − (1 + n)x˜
]
+
β
γ
ln d˜+ η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
ln x˜+ γV (kˆ′)
}
. (59)
We make the guess V (kˆ′) = z0+z1 ln kˆ
′, where z0 and z1 are undetermined coefficients.
For this guess, (59) becomes
V (kˆ) = max
{d˜,x˜,kˆ′}
{
ln
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
− d˜
1 + n
− (1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η − (1 + n)x˜
]
+
β
γ
ln d˜+ η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
ln x˜+ γ
[
z0 + z1 ln kˆ
′
]}
. (60)
The first-order conditions with respect to d˜, x˜, and kˆ′ are
d˜ :
−1/(1 + n)
A
(
kˆ
)α
− d˜/(1 + n)− (1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η − (1 + n)x˜
+
β
γ
· 1
d˜
= 0, (61)
x˜ :
−(1 + n)
[
ηkˆ′D (x˜)η−1 + 1
]
A
(
kˆ
)α
− d˜/(1 + n)− (1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η − (1 + n)x˜
+
η
[
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
]
x˜
= 0, (62)
kˆ′ :
−(1 + n)D (x˜)η
A
(
kˆ
)α
− d˜/(1 + n)− (1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η − (1 + n)x˜
+
γz1
kˆ′
= 0. (63)
Eqs. (61) and (62) lead to
d˜
1 + n
=
β
γη
·
(1 + n)x˜
[
ηkˆ′D (x˜)η−1 + 1
]
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
, (64)
and Eqs. (61) and (63) lead to
d˜
1 + n
=
β
γ
· kˆ
′
γz1
(1 + n)D (x˜)η . (65)
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By plugging (64) into (65) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
ηDkˆ′ =
(x˜)1−η
1
γz1
[
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
]
− 1
. (66)
In addition, by plugging (66) into (64) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
d˜
1 + n
=
β
γη
·
1
γz1
1
γz1
[
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
]
− 1
(1 + n)x˜. (67)
We substitute (66) and (67) into the first-order condition with respect to d˜ in (61) to
obtain
(1 + n)x˜ =
1
φ
{
1
γz1
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
− 1
}
A
(
kˆ
)α
, (68)
where φ is defined by
φ ≡ γ + β
γη
· 1
γz1
+
1
η
+
1
γz1
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
− 1.
Substituting (68) into (67) leads to the following policy function of d˜ :
d˜
1 + n
=
1
φ
· β
γη
· 1
γz1
A
(
kˆ
)α
. (69)
With (66) and (68), we have
(1 + n)kˆ′D (x˜)η =
1
φη
A
(
kˆ
)α
. (70)
We substitute (68), (69), and (70) into the resource constraint in (57) to obtain the
following policy function of c˜ :
c˜ =
1
φγηz1
A
(
kˆ
)α
. (71)
We also obtain from (68) and (70) the law of motion of physical capital:
kˆ′ =
[
A
(
kˆ
)α]1−η
φη(1 + n)D
{
1
φ(1+n)
[
1
γz1
(
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
)
− 1
]}η . (72)
Substituting (68), (69), (71), and (72) into the Bellman equation gives
V (kˆ) = α
{
1 +
β
γ
+ η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
+ γz1 (1− η)
}
ln kˆ + C (z0, z1) ,
where C (z0, z1) includes constant terms. The guess is verified if z0 = C (z0, z1) and
z1 = α
{
1 +
β
γ
+ η
[
β +
γ
1− γ (1 + β)
]
+ γz1 (1− η)
}
.
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Therefore, z1 is given by
z1 =
α
{
1 + β
γ
+ η
[
β + γ
1−γ
(1 + β)
]}
1− αγ (1− η) ,
and the corresponding policy functions are obtained as expressed in Proposition 6.
■
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
The difference in the model in Section 7 from the baseline model is the presence of public
good provision, which appears as θ ln gt + βθ ln gt+1 in the utility function of (26) and as
(2 + n)g/(1 + n) in the government budget constraint of (27). Thus, in the presence of
public good provision, the after-tax income of the middle-aged is Z(·)− (2 + n)g/(1 + n)
and the next-period ratio of physical to human capital is
kˆ′ = Kˆ
(
b′, x, Z(·)− 2 + n
1 + n
g
)
≡
β
1+β
[
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
]− (1 + n)b′
(1 + n)D (x)η
.
The political objective function in (10) is reformulated as follows:
Ω ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω)
[
ln
(
1− τ k)+ θ ln g]+ (1 + β) ln [Z (τ k, x, b′, kˆ, b, h)− 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
+β lnR
(
Kˆ
(
b′, x, Z
(
τ k, x, b′, kˆ, b, h
)
− 2 + n
1 + n
g
))
+ β ln
(
1− τ k′)+ θ ln g + βθ ln g′,
(73)
and the conjecture of τ k′ in (28) is reformulated as follows:
τ k′ = 1− T kg
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g − 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′
α
[
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
] , (74)
where T kg (> 0) is constant. We also conjecture the public good provision in the next
period as
g′ = Gg · A
(
kˆ′
)α
h′.
This leads to
βθ ln g′ ≃ βθα ln
[
Z(·)− 1 + β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
+ (1− α)η ln x. (75)
By substituting (74) and (75) into (73) and rearranging the terms, we have
Ω ≃ ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ln
(
1− τ k)+ ln [Z(·)− 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
+ βα (1 + θ) ln
[
Z(·)− 1 + β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
+
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ ln g
+ βη (1 + θ) (1− α) ln x. (76)
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The first-order conditions with respect to τ k, b′, x, and g are as follows:
τ k : − ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
1− τ k +
αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
+
βα (1 + θ)αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2+n
1+n
g
= 0,
(77)
b′ :
1 + n
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
− α (1 + θ) (1 + n)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2+n
1+n
g
≤ 0, (78)
x :
βη (1 + θ) (1− α)
x
− 1 + n
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
− αβ (1 + θ) (1 + n)
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2+n
1+n
g
= 0, (79)
g :
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
g
−
2+n
1+n
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
− αβ (1 + θ)
2+n
1+n
Z(·)− 1+β
β
(1 + n)b′ − 2+n
1+n
g
= 0, (80)
where a strict inequality holds in (78) if b′ = 0.
b′ = 0 Case Suppose that b′ = 0 holds. Eq. (78) implies that
b′ = 0 if 1 ≤ α (1 + θ) . (81)
When b′ = 0 holds, Eqs. (77) and (79) are rewritten as follows:
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) ·
1
1− τ k =
(1 + αβ (1 + θ))αA
(
kˆ
)α−1 (
kˆh+ b
)
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
, (82)
βη (1 + θ) (1− α)
(1 + n)x
=
1 + αβ (1 + θ)
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
. (83)
Eqs. (82) and (83) lead to the optimal relation between x and τ k:
(1 + n)x =
βη (1 + θ) (1− α)
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
(
1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b) . (84)
Next, recall Eq. (80). When b′ = 0, this is reduced to[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
2+n
1+n
g
=
1 + αβ (1 + θ)
Z(·)− 2+n
1+n
g
. (85)
Eqs. (83) and (85) lead to the optimal relation between g and x :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
βη (1 + θ) (1− α)(1 + n)x. (86)
In addition, (82) and (85) lead to the optimal relation between g and τ k :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
(
1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b) . (87)
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Substituting (84) and (87) into (82) leads to the policy function of τ k :
1− τ k =
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} · 1
α
(
1 + b/kˆh
) . (88)
Substituting (88) into (84) leads to the policy function of x :
(1 + n)x =
βη(1− α){
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} · A(kˆ)α h, (89)
and substituting (89) into (86) leads to the policy function of g :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} · A(kˆ)α h. (90)
Finally, plugging (88)–(90) with b′ = 0 into the government budget constraint leads to
the policy function of τ :
τ = 1− 1
1− α ·
1 + αβ (1 + θ)
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} .
A.8.1 b′ > 0 Case
Alternatively, suppose that b′ > 0 holds. The first-order condition with respect to b′ in
(78), holding with an equality, is rewritten as follows:
(1+n)b′ =
β [1− α (1 + θ)]
1 + αβ (1 + θ)
·
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b)− (1 + n)x− 2 + n
1 + n
g
]
.
(91)
Eqs. (77) and (80) lead to the optimal relation between g and τ k :
(
1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b) = ω(1+n)(1−ω)[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
· 2 + n
1 + n
g, (92)
and Eqs. (79) and (80) lead to the optimal relation between x and g :
(1 + n)x =
βη (1 + θ) (1− α)[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
· 2 + n
1 + n
g. (93)
In addition, Eqs. (78) and (80) lead to{
(1 + β) +
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ
}
· 2 + n
1 + n
g
=
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ
×
[
A
(
kˆ
)α
h− (1− τ k)αA(kˆ)α−1 (kˆh+ b)− (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b′] . (94)
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Substituting (92) and (93) into (91) leads to[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ(1 + n)b′
=
β [1− α (1 + θ)]
1 + αβ (1 + θ)
·
{[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ · A
(
kˆ
)α
h
−
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + βη (1 + θ) (1− α) +
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ
]
· 2 + n
1 + n
g
}
, (95)
and substituting (92) and (93) into (94) leads to[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ(1 + n)b′ (96)
=
{
(1 + β) +
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ +
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + βη (1 + θ) (1− α)
}
× 2 + n
1 + n
g −
[
ω
(1 + n)(1− ω) + 1
]
θ · A
(
kˆ
)α
h.
With the use of (95) and (96), we can obtain the policy functions of g and b′ as follows:
2 + n
1 + n
g =
[
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1
]
θ
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
}A(kˆ)α h, (97)
(1 + n)b′ =
β [1− α (1 + θ)]
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
}A(kˆ)α h. (98)
Eq. (98) indicates that b′ > 0 holds if and only if 1 > α (1 + θ) .
Substituting (97) into (92) leads to the policy function of τ k :
1− τ k =
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} · 1
α
(
1 + b/kˆh
) .
Substituting (97) into (93) leads to the policy function of x :
(1 + n)x =
βη(1− α){
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} · A(kˆ)α h.
Finally, we substitute the policy functions derived above into the government budget
constraint and rearrange the terms to obtain the policy function of τ :
τ = 1− 1 + β
1− α ·
1
(1 + θ)
{
ω
(1+n)(1−ω)
+ 1 + β [α + η (1− α)]
} .
■
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Figure 1: Effects of decreased ε on the labor tax rate (Panel (a)), ratio of physical to
human capital (Panel (b)), education expenditure-to-GDP ratio (Panel (c)), capital tax
rate (Panel (d)), and steady-state growth rate (Panel (e)). The solid and dashed curves
correspond to the cases of ω = 0.48 and 0.2, respectively.
46
Figure 2: Trends of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per-capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)). The solid, dashed, and dot-dashed
curves correspond to the cases of ε = 0, 0.5, and 0.7, respectively.
47
Figure 3: Period 0 capital tax rate.
48
Figure 4: Effects of the temporary implementation of the fiscal rule in period 2. The
solid, dashed, and chain lines depict the cases in which the rule is terminated at the end
of periods 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Note: Panels (a)–(i) show the response by focusing on the ratio of the variable in the
presence of the temporary implementation to that in its absence. Panel (j) plots the
difference in utility between the presence and absence of the temporary implementation.
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Figure 5: Trends of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), hu-
man capital (Panel (b)), per-capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consump-
tion (Panel (d)), old-age consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)).
Note: The lines in Panels (a)–(e) show the ratio of the concerned variable at the po-
litical equilibrium to that in the planner’s allocation. Each ratio implies that the political
equilibrium outweighs (fails behind) the planner’s allocation when the ratio is above (be-
low) unity. The line in Panel (f) plots the difference in utility between the political
equilibrium and planner’s allocation. The same note applies to Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Trends of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per-capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)).
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Figure A.1: Illustration of the left-hand side and right-hand side of Eq. (53).
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